Cerritos Trucking Co., Et Al. v. Utah Venture No. 1, Et Al. And Utah Development Company, Inc., Et Al. v. Bettilyon Realty Company, Et Al. : Brief of Defendants And Cross Plaintiffs-Appellants by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1981
Cerritos Trucking Co., Et Al. v. Utah Venture No. 1,
Et Al. And Utah Development Company, Inc., Et
Al. v. Bettilyon Realty Company, Et Al. : Brief of
Defendants And Cross Plaintiffs-Appellants
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors. Joseph C. Rust; Attorney for Cross Defendant Dunahoo-
RespondentsGary A. Weston; Attorney forCross Defendant Bettilyon-RespondentRobert A.
Attorney for Defendants and Cross Plaintiffs-Appellants
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Cerritos Trucking v. Utah Venture No. 1, No. 17185 (Utah Supreme Court, 1981).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2408
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CERRITOS TRUCKING CO., et al., 
vs. 
Plaintiffs-
Respondents, 
UTAH VENTURE NO. 1, et al., 
Defendants-
Appellants. 
UTAH DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 
INC., et al., 
vs. 
Cross Plaintiffs-
Appellants, 
BETTILYON REALTY COMPANY, et al., 
Cross Defendants-
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS 
No. 17185 
AND CROSS PLAINTIFFS - APPELLANTS 
Appeal from Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, The Honorable Peter F. Leary 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
ROBERT A. PETERSON 
KESLER, RUST & WILLIAMS 
JOSEPH C. RUST 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Cross Plaintiffs - Appellants 
Suite 2000, Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Cross Defendant Dunahoo-Respondents 
SENIOR & SENIOR 
GARY A. WESTON 
Suite 2000, Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
1""" 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Cross Defendant 
Bettilyon-Respondent 
-----------------
"'·.' "" '•""' CoUl'I, Ui.:I ....-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CERRITOS TRUCKING CO., et al., 
vs. 
Plaintiffs-
Respondents, 
UTAH VENTURE NO. 1, et al., 
Defendants-
Appellants. 
UTAH DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 
me., et al., 
vs. 
Cross Plaintiffs-
Appellants, 
BETTILYON REALTY COMPANY, et al., 
Cross Defendants-
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS 
No. 17185 
AND CROSS PLAINTIFFS - APPELLANTS 
Appeal from Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, The Honorable Peter F. Leary 
KESLER, RUST & WILLIAMS 
JOSEPH C. RUST 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
ROBERT A. PETERSON 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Cross Plaintiffs - Appellants 
Suite 2000, Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Cross Defendant Dunahoo-Respondents 
SENIOR & SENIOR 
GARY A. WESTON 
Suite 2000, Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Cross Defendant 
Bettilyon-Respondent 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Fundi g for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
DISPOSITIOl~ OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER COURT............. 2 
Relief Sought On Appeal.............................. 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE WITH CITATIONS TO THE RECORD..... 2 
A. Parties.......................................... 2 
B. Factual Background............................... 4 
ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
POINT I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
A DIRECTED VERDICT......................... 10 
A. The District Court Applied the Wrong Legal 
Standard in Granting the Directed Verdict...... 11 
POINT II. DEFENDANTS PRESENTED EVIDENCE FROM 
WHICH THE JURY COULD HAVE FOUND IN 
FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS ON THEIR CLAIM 
BASED UPON NEGLIGE•~T MISREPRESENTATION. . . . . 16 
A. A Misrepresentation Was Made to Lowenberg 
By or On Behalf of Plaintiffs and Cross-
Def endants .................................... . 
B. The Representation Was to a Presently 
Existing Fact ............................. · .. ·· 
C. The Representations Made to Lowenberg Were 
Material ............................. · .. · · · · · · · 
D. Lowenberg Reasonably Relied Upon the 
Representation Made to Him .................... . 
E. Plaintiffs and Cross-Defendants Were 
Negligent in Representing to Lowenberg 
that the Fiber-Sciences Group Would Own or 
Participate in the Ownership of the Property ... 
F. There Was Evidence of Damage to Defendants 
as a Result of the Misrepresentations Made 
By Plaintiffs and Cross-Defendants ......... ···· 
18 
19 
21 
23-24 
25 
29 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
G. Defendants Offered Testimony as to All 
of the Elements of Negligent Misrepresentation.. 30 
POINT III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RECEIVING 
AND SIGNING FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW SUBSEQUENT TO 
RULING ON THE MOTION FOR A DIRECTED 
VERDICT................................... 32 
POINT IV. THERE WAS EVIDENCE PRESENTED FROM WHICH 
THE JURY COULD HAVE CONCLUDED THAT 
PLAINTIFFS AND CROSS-DEFENDANTS 
BREACHED FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS OWED 
TO DEFENDANTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 
A. Evidence Was Presented From Which the Jurv 
Could Have Determined that Plaintiffs and. 
Cross-Defendant Dunahoo Breached Fiduciary 
Duties Owing to Lowenberg....... .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 
B. Evidence Was Adduced From Which the Jury 
Could Have Determined that the Cross-
Defendant Bettilyon Breached a Duty of 
Trust and Confidence............................ 37 
CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 
CASES AND AUTHORITIES CITED 
CASES: 
Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives v. Meibos, 
607 P. za 798 (1980) ................................ . 
Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298 (1978) ............... . 
Boskovich v. Utah Constr. Co., 123 Utah 387, 259 P.2d 
885 (1953) ......................................... . 
Christensen v. Utah Rapid Transit Co., 83 Utah 231, 
2 7 p . 2 d 46 8 ' 4 71 ( 19 3 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Dugan v. Jones, No. 16334 (Utah Sup. Ct.) filed July 
23, 1980 ........................................... . 
i 
14. u, I 
20' 21,' 
22' 21 
35 
12 
12 
17' 18, i 
22, 26,: 
21. 30, I 
31, 38, 
39 
L 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Ellis v. Hale, 13 Utah 2d 279, 373 P.2d 382 (1962) ..... 
Finlayson v. Brady, 121 Utah 204, 240 P.2d 491 
(1952) ............................................ . 
Flynn v. W. P. Harlin Constr. Co., 509 P.2d 356, 
(1973) ............................................ . 
Jarjine v. Brunswick Corp., 18 Utah 2d 378, 
423 p. 2d 659 (1967) ............................... . 
McCutcheon v. Brownfield, 2 Wash. App. 348, 
46 7 p. 2d 868 (1970) ............................... . 
O'Brien v. Westinghouse Electric Coro., 293 F.2d 1 
(3rd Cir. 1960) ................................... . 
Smith v. Thornton, 23 Utah 2d 110, 458 P.2d 870 (1969). 
RULES: 
16 
12, 
16 
13, 
16, 
35 
33, 
32 
Rule 50,Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.................. 11 
Rule 50(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.............. 33 
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.............. 32 
13, 
16 
17 
34 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CERRITOS TRUCKING CO., a 
California corporation, and 
CERRITOS TRUCKING CO. , 
DONALD E. HEIMARK, JAMES B. 
FLEMING, and WILLIAM L. 
FARIESTER dba CERRITOS 
ASSOCIATES, a partnership, 
VS. 
Plaintiffs-
Respondents, 
UTAH VENTURE NO. 1, 
WILLIAM J. LOWENBERG, 
FERNE. LOWENBERG, and 
UTAH DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Defendants-
Appellants. 
UTAH DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 
INC., a corporation and 
WILLIAM J . LOWENBERG, 
vs. 
Cross Plaintiffs-
Appellants, 
BETTILYON REALTY COMPANY, 
a corporation, and EDMOND 
0. DUNAHOO, 
Cross Defendants-
Respondents. 
No. 17185 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS 
AND CROSS PLAINTIFFS - APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In this action plaintiffs-respondents sought specific 
performance of an option to purchase real property and damages; 
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defendants-appellants sought, alternatively, rescission and 
damages against plaintiffs and cross-defendants based upon 
misrepresentation, mutual mistake and breach of fiduciary duty. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN 
THE LOWER COURT 
Following a trial by jury, the district court granted 
directed verdicts in favor of plaintiffs and cross-defendants, ana 
against defendants, counterclairnants and cross-plaintiffs. 
Defendants, counterclaimants and cross-plaintiffs appeal from 
the granting of said directed verdicts and the subsequent entry 
of findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Relief Sought on Appeal. 
Defendants-respondents seek an order of this Court 
reversing the granting of the directed verdicts in favor of 
plaintiffs and cross-defendants and an order that a new trial 
be granted in this action. Defendants-respondents also seek 
an order of this Court striking the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law filed by the district court in support 
of its granting of a directed verdict. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE WITH 
CITATIONS TO THE RECORD 
A. Parties. 
Defendant William J. Lowenberg is a resident of 
San Francisco who is engaged in the real estate business. 
Defendants Utah Venture No. l and Utah Development Company, 
Inc. are entities owned and controlled by Lowenberg. Each, 
-2-
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at various times, held legal title to the property at issue 
in this action and are nominal parties to this action. 
Plaintiff-respondent and counterclaim defendant 
Cerritos Trucking Company is a California corporation and 
the optionee of an option granted by Lowenberg on or about 
April 28, 1978 (hereinafter "the Option"). Plaintiff-
respondent and counterclaim defendant Cerritos Associates 
is a partnership comprised of plaintiffs-respondents 
Cerritos Trucking Company, Donald E. Heimark, William L. 
Fariester and James B. Fleming. Cerritos Associates was 
the assignee of the Option. Messrs. Heimark, Fleming and 
Fariester, also counterclaim defendants, were officers and 
partners, respectively, of Cerritos Trucking Company and 
Cerritos Associates. Those three individuals are the 
ultimate beneficiaries of the Option at issue herein. 
(Hereinafter, Cerritos Trucking Company, Cerritos Associates, 
Mr. Heimark, Mr. Fleming and Mr. Fariester are collectively 
referred to as the "Cerritos Group".) 
Cross-defendant Bettilyon Realty Company was the 
intermediary between defendant Lowenberg on the one hand 
and plaintiffs and cross-defendant Dunahoo on the other hand 
with respect to negotiating of the lease and Option of the 
property at issue. One Gerald Daughtrey acted on behalf of 
Bettilyon Realty Company in this respect. 
Cross-defendant Edmond O. Dunahoo was the President 
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of Fiber-Sciences, Inc., the sublessee on the property and 
actual tenant of the property in question. Fiber-Sciences, 
Inc. was a wholly-owned subsidiary of EDO, a publicly held 
corporation. (Hereinafter, Mr. Dunahoo and the other officers 
of Fiber Sciences, in their individual capacities, are 
collectively referred to as "the Fiber Sciences Group".) 
B. Factual Background. 
Lowenberg purchased a parcel of real property 
located at the International Center near Salt Lake Airport 
in 1977. (Tr. of trial at p. 41, line 21-25; testimony of 
William Lowenberg). He then developed the property by hiring 
a contractor to design and construct that warehouse as 
designed. (That parcel, as improved is hereafter referred 
to as "the Property".) By early 1978 the improvements on the 
Property were nearing completion. Lowenberg desired to find 
a lease tenant or tenants to occupy the Property. (Tr. p. 42, 
lines 17-23; testimony of William Lowenberg). 
Lowenberg contacted several realtors to assist him 
in seeking a lease tenant or tenants. Among those was 
Bettilyon Realty Company. (Tr. of trial at p. 43, lines 1-5; 
testimony of William Lowenberg). The person acting on behalf 
of Bettilyon in this respect was Gerald Daughtrey. 
During the period when Lowenberg was seeking a 
lessee for the Property, Fiber-Sciences, a corporation en-
gaged in manufacturing water and waste tank systems for 
-4-
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aircrafts, had determined that it needed space in Salt Lake 
City for a warehousing and manufacturing operation. (Tr. p. 137, 
lines 8-14; testimony of Edmond Dunahoo). Its needs were for the 
type of property Lowenberg had to offer. Officers of Fiber-
Sciences had contacted Bettilyon Realty to assist in the search 
for a suitable property. Mr. Daughtrey, on behalf of Bettilyon 
Realty, showed officers of Fiber-Sciences various properties, 
including the Property owned by Mr. Lowenberg. The officers 
of Fiber Sciences determined that the Lowenberg Property was 
best suited to Fiber-Sciences' needs. (Tr. p. 140; testimony 
of Edmond Dunahoo). 
Fiber-Sciences was a wholly-owned corporation of 
EDO, a publicly held corporation. The officers of Fiber-
Sciences were informed by the parent EDO that Fiber-Sciences 
should lease, not purchase, the property it required in Salt 
Lake City. (Tr. p. 138; testimony of Edmond Dunahoo). 
However, Mr. Dunahoo and several of his vice 
presidents, the Fiber Sciences Group, determined that they, 
in their individual capacities, wished to purchase property 
and in turn lease it to Fiber-Sciences. (Tr. p. 144, lines 1-3; 
testimony of Edmond Dunahoo). The officers of Fiber-Sciences 
determined that the purchase of Lowenberg's Property would be 
a good investment for them and would provide a potential 
retirement benefit that they did not at that time enjoy. 
(Tr. p. 151; testimony of Edmond Dunahoo). 
-5-
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Because of the desire of the officers of Fiber-
Sciences to own the Property, and notwithstanding that Fiber-
Sciences or EDO did not wish to own the Property, Fiber-
Sciences determined to purchase, not lease, the Property 
from Lowenberg. (Tr. p. 150, lines 18-20; testimony of 
Edmond Dunahoo). The only reason not to lease the Property 
directly from Lowenberg was a desire of the Fiber-Sciences 
officers to own or participate in the ownership of the 
Property in their individual capacities. (Tr. p. 168; 
testimony of Edmond Dunahoo). 
Mr. Heimark, President of Cerritos Trucking Company, 
was a long-time friend of Mr. Dunahoo. Mr. Heimark and Mr. 
Dunahoo entered into an oral agreement that the Cerritos 
Group and the Fiber-Sciences officers would share in the 
ownership of the Property upon exercise of the Option. (Tr. 
p. 89, line 22; p. 94, lines 19-20; p. 96, line 9; testimony 
of Donald Heimark; Tr. pp. 153-154; testimony of Edmond 
Dunahoo; Tr. p. 128, lines 1-3; pp. 129-130; testimony of 
Gerald Daughtrey) . 
Subsequent to the "hand-shake" agreement between 
the Cerritos Group and the Fiber-Sciences Group, Mr. Daughtrey 
brought to Mr. Lowenberg a proposal that Fiber-Sciences would 
lease the Property if an option to purchase the Property was 
granted to the Fiber-Sciences Group. Mr. Daughtrey told 
Bill Lowenberg that the Fiber-Sciences Group would own or 
-6-
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participate in the ownership of the Property. (Tr. p. 127, lines 
5-6; p. 128, lines 1-3; testimony of Gerald Daughtrey). In fact, 
the Option was negotiated by Mr. Daughtrey on the basis that the 
Fiber-Sciences people would own or participate in the ownership 
of the Property. (Tr. pp. 129-130; testimony of Gerald Daughtrey). 
There were no direct dealings between Lowenberg on the one hand 
and either the Cerritos Group or the Fiber-Sciences Group on the 
other hand. All communications were transmitted through the 
agency of Mr. Daughtrey. (Tr. p. 165, lines 23-25; testimony 
of Edmond Dunahoo). 
Mr. Lowenberg was not told that Fiber-Sciences would 
lease the building directly from him if there could be no 
purchase option. (Tr. p. 205, lines 13-17; testimony of Gerald 
Daughtrey). Mr. Lowenberg did not wish to sell the Property, 
only to lease it. (Tr. p. 42, lines 17-20; testimony of William 
Lowenberg). However, he was told that Fiber-Sciences would not 
lease the Property unless the officers of Fiber-Sciences and/or 
EDO could, in their individual capacities, be given the option 
to buy the Property. (Tr. at p. 46, lines 20-24). 
It was Mr. Lowenberg's understanding that Cerritos 
Trucking Company was to be the "vehicle" or nominee to hold 
the Option but that the option was to be exercised by, and the 
ownership of the Property ultimately was to vest in the officers 
of Fiber-Sciences. (Tr. p. 48, lines 9-13; testimony of William 
Lowenberg). Mr. Lowenberg was unwilling to grant an option to 
purchase the Property to anyone other than the officers of 
-7-
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Fiber-Sciences. (Tr. p. 48; lines 21-23; testimony of William 
Lowenberg). In fact, but for the representation that the 
officers of Fiber-Sciences would own the Property, Mr. Lowenberg 
would not have granted an option or sold the Property. (Tr. 
p. 218; testimony of William Lowenberg). 
On or about April 28, 1978, Mr. Lowenberg executed 
both a lease and an Option to Cerritos Trucking Company. Mr. 
Lowenberg understood that Cerritos was a "vehicle" or a nominee 
and that the Option as drafted would be sufficient to cover t~ 
"intent" of the parties that the officers of Fiber-Sciences woul: 
own the building upon the exercise of the Option. (Tr. p. 227, 
lines 19-22; testimony of William Lowenberg). These concessions 
on Mr. Lowenberg's part were purely business oriented. (Tr. 
p. 217, lines 13-18; testimony of William Lowenberg). The 
concessions that Mr. Lowenberg made were first, that he would 
grant an option to purchase the buidling, and second, he gave 
an extremely favorable price for the building to the officers 
of Fiber-Sciences. (Tr. p. 49, lines 3-11; testimony of 
William Lowenberg). 
Sometime in late January or early February 1979, 
Mr. Lowenberg heard rumors that the Fiber-Sciences Group would 
not own the building upon the exercise of the Option. Mr. 
Lowenberg confronted Dunahoo with that information, and Dunahoo 
admitted that Fiber-Sciences officers would not so own the 
Property. (Tr. p. 219, lines 2-14; testimony of William 
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Lowenberg). The officers of Fiber-Sciences had learned in 
the surmner of 1978 that they would not participate in the 
ownership but had no so informed Mr. Lowenberg. (Tr. p. 157; 
testimony of Edmond Dunahoo). EDO or its counsel had deter-
mined that for Mr. Dunahoo and other officers of Fiber-Sciences 
to own the building and lease it to Fiber-Sciences, Inc. would 
be a conflict of interest requiring disclosure to EDO's share-
holders. Upon learning that the Fiber-Sciences Group would 
not own the building, Mr. Lowenberg refused to honor the option 
and tendered the $5,000.00 option price back to Cerritos 
Trucking Company. 
Subsequently, plaintiffs brought this action seeking 
to enforce the Option and for damages. The damages alleged 
were the differential between the lease payments that had been 
received by Lowenberg subsequent to notice of the exercise of the 
Option and the amount of the mortgage payments during that period 
that had been paid by Mr. Lowenberg. 
Lowenberg denied his obligation to perform under the 
Option and counterclaimed and cross-claimed for misrepresenta-
tion, breach of fiduciary duty and sought, additionally, 
reformation of the contract. 
Trial was had in this matter before a jury demanded 
by defendant Lowenberg. All parties rested on Thursday 
afternoon. Counsel for all parties spent several hours with 
the court drafting and agreeing upon jury instructions on 
Friday. On Monday, the district court did not call back the 
-9-
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jury to be charged and deliberate but instead granted the 
directed verdict. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
A DIRECTED VERDICT. 
At the close of evidence, plaintiffs' counsel made 
a speaking motion for a directed verdict. The grounds therefor 
were stated by counsel for plaintiffs as follows: 
(1) There was no misrepresentation, no fraud 
and no damages; (Tr. p. 292, lines 13-15) 
(2) The record was void of material misrepre-
sentations; (Tr. p. 293, lines 21 and 22) 
(3) There was no reliance on the part of 
Lowenberg; (Tr. p. 294, line 18) 
(4) There was no material mistake of fact; 
(Tr. p. 296, lines 2-8) 
(5) The representations made to Mr. Lowenberg 
were "bona fide expectations"; (Tr. p. 296, lines 
9-10) and 
(6) The misrepresentations were in fact 
"predictions of future events". (Tr. p. 319, 
lines 1-2). 
After argument and a delay of nearly three days, 
the court granted the motion, ruling and finding as follows: 
(1) "Defendant has failed by a preponderance 
of the evidence"; (Tr. at p. 329, lines 8-13) 
-10-
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(2) There was no fraud or misrepresentation; 
(Tr. p. 329, line 20) 
(3) Defendant did not rely upon representations 
made; (Tr. p. 330, lines 3-4) and 
(4) The representations made were as to future 
acts. (Tr. p. 331, lines 6-7). 
Defendants-appellants respectfully submit that the 
district court erred in granting the directed verdict and in 
so doing erred in applying the wrong legal standard to determine 
whether a directed verdict should have been granted. 
A. The District Court Applied the Wrong Legal 
Standard in Granting the Directed Verdict. 
Pursuant to Rule 50 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, a motion for a directed verdict shall state the 
specific grounds therefor. As set forth, supra at p. 10, 
plaintiffs based their motion on the grounds that defendants 
had failed to produce evidence indicating a misrepresentation, 
a mistake or damages, and additionally that any representations 
made were as to a "future act" and therefore not misrepresenta-
tions but merely predictions. None of plaintiffs' arguments 
can withstand scrutiny. 
In directing a verdict, the court must examine the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom 
the directed verdict is attendant; it is not the province of 
the court to weigh or determine the preponderance of the 
-11-
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evidence. Every controverted fact must be resolved in that 
party's favor. (Finlayson v. Brady, 121 Utah 204, 240 P. 2d 491 
(1952); Boskovich v. Utah Constr. Co., 123 Utah 387, 259 P.2d 
885 (1953)). As this Court noted in Finlayson v. Brady, supra, 
the Constitution, statutes and case authority establish the righ: 
to a trial, and decision, by jury where there is evidence on 
both sides. (240 P.2d at 492). 
If there was some substantial evidence in support of 
the essential facts which a party is required to prove, or if 
evidence or inferences deducible therefrom were of a character 
which would cause reasonable men to arrive at different conclu-
sions, a directed verdict may not be granted. (Christensen v. 
Utah Rapid Transit Co., 83 Utah 231, 27 P.2d 468, 471 (1933)). 
In a recent decision of this Court reviewing and 
reversing the granting of a judgment n.o.v., it was stated 
as follows: 
"When a party has so requested, he is 
entitled to a trial by a jury of his fellow 
citizens. In order that that right be 
safeguarded as it should be, it is essen-
tial that the jury have the exclusive 
prerogative of passing upon the credibility 
of the evidence and of determining the facts. 
Therefore, no matter how ardent may be 
the trial judge's desire to see that justice 
is done from his own point of view, he has 
an obligation of judicial restraint: to 
make allowance for the fact that other 
reasonable minds might arrive at a differ-
ent conclusion than his own. 
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It has long been established in our law 
that a court should not take the case from 
the jury where there is any substantial dis-
pute in the evidence on issues of fact but 
can properly do so only when the matte~ is 
so plain that there really is no conflict 
in the evidence upon which reasonable minds 
could differ." 
Flvnn v. W. P. Harlin Constr. Co., 509 P.2d 
356' 360-61 (1973). 
The transcript unequivocably demonstrates that the 
district court substituted its determination of the facts for 
those that were or should have been those of the jury. For 
instance, the court stated: 
"The Court further finds that the defendant 
has failed in its burden of proof by a preponder-
ance of the evidence as to the count or counts 
that the burden of proof is applicable, and has 
failed in its burden of proof by clear and con-
vincing evidence as to the count or counts that 
the burden of proof is applicable." 
(Tr. at p. 329, lines 8-13). 
It is for the jury to determine whether the defen-
dant has failed in its burden of proof by a preponderance of 
the evidence, not the court. (Finlayson v. Brady, supra). 
It was improper for the district court to weigh the 
evidence and determine where the preponderancy lay. That 
inquiry is the exclusive province of the jury. The district 
court may well have determined, after three days in which to 
consider testimony and in light of the jury instructions that 
counsel for all parties and the court were considering, that 
the preponderance of the evidence was with plaintiff. None-
theless, his substituting of his judgment for that of the 
jury was clear and prejudicial error. 
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The arguments of plaintiffs' counsel in support of 
their motions for a directed verdict invited the district comt 
to make such substitutions. No legal authority was presented 
to support the proposition that the evidence presented by 
defendants was legally insufficient. Instead, the thrust of 
their argument was conclusory statements in which a weighing 
of the evidence was implicit. As will be pointed out more 
fully, infra, there was sufficient evidence presented by 
defendants from which the jury could have determined that 
Lowenberg placed reasonable reliance upon material represen-
tations made to him and was damaged thereby. It was error for 
the district court to arrogate to itself the weighing of that 
evidence in this case. 
Other "findings" of the district court were similarly 
conclusory and reflected an implicit weighing of the evidence. 
For instance, the court further ruled and found: 
"that, number one, that there has been 
no fraud or misrepresentation." 
(Tr. p. 329, lines 19-20). 
The question of whether or not there was a misrepre· 
sentation is, under Utah law, a determination for the jury. 
(Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives v. Meibos, 607 P. 2d 798 (1980)). 
The court did not find that there was no evidence supporting 
defendants' contentions that misrepresentations had been made, 
but, obviously, weighed the evidence and concluded that there 
had been "no misrepresentation". 
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As a matter of fact, the evidence was quite to the 
contrary; there had been a clear misrepresentation made to 
Mr. Lowenberg. That misrepresentation was that if he would 
grant an option, that option would be for the benefit of and 
exercised by the officers of Fiber-Sciences. All parties 
testified that an agreement had been entered into between the 
Cerritos Group and the Fiber-Sciences Group to that effect. 
Mr. Daughtrey testified that he negotiated the lease and 
Option between Cerritos and Mr. Lowenberg "on that basis" 
and Mr. Lowenberg testified that he would not have granted 
an option but for that representation. Similarly, there is no 
question but that representation proved untrue and that the 
Fiber-Sciences Group did not participate in or benefit from 
the ownership of the Property upon the exercise of the Option. 
Thus, there can be no question but that evidence was adduced 
supporting defendants' contention that a representation was 
made to Mr. Lowenberg that proved false. Therefore, the ques-
tion for the jury was properly whether or not plaintiffs and 
cross-defendants acted negligently in causing that representa-
tion to be made to Mr. Lowenberg by Mr. Daughtrey and in 
negotiating the Option on that understanding. It is abundantly 
clear, based upon the record, that there was substantial evidence 
presented to the jury from which they could have concluded that 
there had been a negligent misrepresentation made to Mr. Lowenberg 
on behalf of plaintiffs and cross-defendants. Defendants, 
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therefore, submit that it was clear error for the court to 
substitute its decision for that of the jury and that said 
error is prejudicial and sufficient to cause a reversal and 
the granting of a new trial. 
Under Utah law, in a misrepresentation case the 
issues of (1) whether a misrepresentation was made; (2) 
whether there was fraud or negligence by the person making 
the misrepresentation; (3) the materiality of any misrepre-
sentations; and (5) whether any damage resulted therefrom, 
are all questions for the jury and must be submitted to the 
jury if there is conflicing evidence. (Flynn v. W. P. Harlin 
Constr. Co., supra; Finlayson v. Brady, supra). The court 
should not have taken those issues from the jury in this case. 
POINT II. DEFENDANTS PRESENTED EVIDENCE FROM 
WHICH THE JURY COULD HAVE FOUND IN 
FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS ON THEIR CLAIM 
BASED UPON NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION. 
The tort of negligent misrepresentation has long 
been recognized in the State of Utah. (Jardine v. Brunswick 
Corp., 18 Utah 2d 378, 423 P.2d 659 (1967); Ellis v. Hale, 
13 Utah 2d 279, 373 P.2d 382 (1962)). In Jardine, the court 
stated as follows: 
"Where one having a pecuniary interest 
in a transaction, is in a superior position 
to know material facts, and carelessly or 
negligently makes a false representation 
concerning them, expecting the other party 
to rely and act thereon, and the other 
party reasonably does so and suffers loss 
in that transaction, the representor can be 
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held responsible if the other elements of 
fraud are also present." 
(423 P.2d at 662). 
Jardine v. Brunswick has been cited with approval by 
this Court recently in Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives v. Meibos, 
607 P.2d 798 (1980) and Dugan v. Jones, No. 16334, filed July 23, 
1980). In the Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives case, this Court 
refused to reverse a jury verdict for defendants. The plaintiff 
bank had brought actions against the defendants for collection 
of promissory notes. Each defendant had alleged as a defense 
that the plaintiff had fraudulently induced them to execute the 
notes. In refusing to overturn the jury verdict, this Court 
stated as follows: 
"Although the evidence was conflicting in 
many respects, there was substantial 
evidence upon which the jury could find 
all the elements of fraud." 
(607 P.2d at 800). 
"The issue of actual reliance and the 
reasonableness of reliance is, of course, 
for the jury to determine. 
The fact is there is ample evidence in the 
record from which the jury could find that 
representation to have indeed been made." 
(607 P.2d at 801). 
"Under the circumstances of this case, it 
was clearly, as the trial court properly 
ruled, within the province of the jury to 
determine whether defendants' reliance on 
the repeated assertions of plaintiff was 
justified." 
(607 P.2d at 802). 
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In Dugan v. Jones, supra, this Court reversed the 
district court's denial of a trial by jury of defendants' 
counterclai~s and cross-claims alleging fraud, negligent 
misrepresen ation, breach of contract and breach of fiduciary 
duty. This ~ourt held that despite the fact that plaintiff 
asserted onl; equitable claims, defendant was entitled to 
a trial by jury on his legal counterclaims and cross-claims. 
That case was remanded for a jury trial. 
Defendants in this action presented evidence on 
all elements of negligent misrepresentation from which the 
jury could have found in their favor. In this circumstance, 
it is appropriate that this Court remand for a new trial. 
(Dugan v. Jones, supra). 
A. A Misrepresentation Was Made to Lowenberg 
By or On Behalf of Plaintiffs and Cross-
Defendants. 
Defendants submit that there is no question but that 
the unqualified and unconditional representation was made to 
Lowenberg that the Option to purchase was for the benefit of 
the officers of Fiber-Sciences and that those individuals would 
own or participate in the ownership of the Property upon its 
exercise. The only dispute in the testimony is whether 
Lowenberg was told that the ownership would exclusively be 
for the benefit of the Fiber-Sciences Group or whether they 
would "participate" in the ownership of the Property. 
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(Compare testimony of William Lowenberg at Tr. p. 48, lines 
18-20 with that of Gerald Daughtrey at Tr. p. 127, lines 5-6). 
Even the district court appears to have acknowledged the making 
of that representation. (Tr. p. 321, remarks of district court). 
It is inconceivable that the district court could have 
determined that there was an absence of evidence that could 
support a jury determination that such a representation was 
made. Similarly, there was no doubt that that representation 
proved untrue. Mr. Dunahoo stated unequivocably that he and 
his group would not participate in the ownership of the building. 
(Tr. p. 159, line 22; p. 160, line 10; testimony of Edmond Dunahoo). 
Defendants submit that there is no question but that a representa-
tion was made to Lowenberg that proved untrue. 
B. The Representation Was to a Presently Existing 
Fact. 
Counsel for plaintiffs advance the argument in support 
of their directed verdict that the representation made to Mr. 
Lowenberg that the option would be for the benefit of the Fiber-
Sciences Group and that they would participate in the ownership 
of the Property was not actionable because it concerned a future 
event. Their argument appears to be that because the Option 
could not be exercised until some future date, any representation 
as to the effect of the exercise of that Option was necessarily 
an opinion or prediction as to a future event. The inverse of 
that argument presumably is that there was no misrepresentation 
as to a presently existing fact. 
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Their argument misses the crucial point. The repre-
sentation made to Mr. Lowenberg was that the Option was for 
the benefit of the Fiber-Sciences Group. The unconditional and 
unqualified representation was not that if events in the future 
proved propitious the Fiber-Sciences Group might receive some 
remote benefit from the grant of the Option, but that it was 
presently intended and agreed upon that the Option would be for 
the benefit of the Fiber-Sciences Group and that they would 
participate, upon the exercise of the Option, in the ownership 
of the Property. 
That was a respresentation as to a present state of 
mind, intention and agreement. The fact that the Option could 
only be exercised in the future does not detract from the fact 
that the representation made was as to a presently existing 
fact--viz., the agreement and intent of the Fiber-Sciences 
Group and the Cerritos Group. 
An argument similar to that advanced by plaintiffs in 
this action was advanced by plaintiffs in Berkeley Bank for 
Cooperatives, supra. In that case, plaintiffs argued that fraud 
or misrepresentation could not be predicated upon representations 
or statements of an intention to perform or not perform an act 
in the future. In that case, the representation was that the 
promissory notes would not be collected. This Court readily 
disposed of that argument as follows: 
"Plaintiff also grounds its appeal on 
the principle that fraud cannot be predicated 
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upon representations or statements of an 
~ntention to perform or not perform an act 
in the future. However, what is involved 
in this case is whether the fact of the then 
present intent of the bank a"ttlie time of its 
representations to the farmers was contrary 
to the statements made to the farmers. Under 
such circumstances, the misrepresentations are 
actionable. As stated in Harper and James, 
The Law of Torts, Vol. 1, 571-72 (1956): 
A closely similar problem is raised 
by a promise or statement of future 
conduct by one who, at the time, intends 
not to fulfill the promise. The promise 
itself is regarded as a representation 
of a present intention to perform. 
Hence, such a promise, made by one 
not intending to perf orrn operates as 
a misrepresentation--a misrepresentation 
of the speaker's state of mind, at the 
time, and is actionable as a misrepre-
sentation of 'fact.'" 
607 P.2d at 804. 
In this action, then, the misrepresentation was as 
to the agreement and intention of the Cerritos Group and the 
Fiber-Sciences Group at the time of the granting of the Option. 
That was a presently existing fact and was a negligently made 
representation that proved false. 
C. The Representations Made to Lowenberg Were 
Material. 
Mr. Lowenberg testified that but for the fact that 
the Fiber-Sciences Group was to own the Property, he would not 
have granted an option to purchase the Property. (Tr. p. 218, 
lines 3-5). That testimony is moreover entirely consistent 
with prior actions of Mr. Lowenberg. For instance, he stated 
that he did not wish to sell the Property but wished to lease 
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it. (Tr. p. 42, lines 17-20; testimony of William Lowenberg). 
Moreover, Mr. Lowenberg had previously been unwilling 
to sell the Property. It was only after he was told that the 
Option would be for the benefit of the Fiber-Sciences Group and 
that they required it that he agreed to grant an Option for the 
purchase of the Property. Mr. Daughtrey further testified that 
the lease and Option was "negotiated on the basis" that the Fiber· 
Sciences Group would participate. (Tr. pp. 129-130; testimony~, 
Gerald Daughtrey) . 
Thus, from the fact that the Option was negotiated on 
the basis that the Fiber-Sciences Group would participate, it 
may be inferred that the Fiber-Sciences Group and the Cerritos 
Group understood the materiality and importance of that factor. 
The obvious inference to be drawn from all the testimony is that 
the Fiber-Sciences Group would own or participate in the owner-
ship of the Property was a material fact and was the basis for 
negotiation of the Option. 
Certainly, it must be concluded that the jury could 
have inferred from the testimony presented to them that that 
fact was "material". Under the law applicable in this juris-
diction, the question of materiality is clearly one for the jury. 
(Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives v. Meibos, supra; Dugan v. Jones, 
supra). Therefore, it was error for the district court not to 
allow the jury to determine the materiality of the representation. 
D. Lowenberg Reasonably Relied Upon the Representat~ 
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~' 
Made to Hirn. 
Evidence was presented at trial from which the jury 
could have determined that Lowenberg relied upon the represen-
tation made to him that the Fiber-Sciences Group would own or 
participate in the ownership of the Property upon the exercise 
of the Option. Lowenberg's own testimony was unequivocable on 
~ that point. He stated in no uncertain terms that but for the 
fact that the Fiber-Sciences people were to own the Property, 
he would not have granted the Option. (Tr. p. 218, lines 3-5). 
This is, of course, consistent with his earlier course of action 
in refusing to grant an option to purchase, or to sell the 
Property, prior to being informed that the Fiber-Sciences Group 
would own or participate in the ownership of the Property. 
It is often the case that evidence of reliance must 
be primarily proved by the testimony of the party claiming 
reliance. That was indeed the case in Berkeley Bank for 
Cooperatives, supra: 
"The defendants stated they would have 
continued to refuse to sign the notes 
if they had not been repeatedly assured 
that the notes were required as a standard 
procedure of all coops getting loans from 
plaintiff, that they were solely for the 
purpose of assuring Dairymen with a source 
of milk, and that they would not be collected." 
607 P. 2d at 801. 
Again, there were facts presented from which the jury 
m. could have concluded that Lowenberg acted in reliance upon the 
~ representations made. The factual issue of reliance was one 
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invested in the province of the jury, and it was error for the 
district court to itself weigh the evidence and conclude that 
Mr. Lowenberg had not relied. 
The court based its conclusion in part upon the notion 
that the Option was expressly "assignable". From this the 
district court concluded that Lowenberg could not have relied 
upon the representation that the Option would be for the benefit 
of the Fiber-Sciences Group. In doing so, the court was obvious::
1 
weighing the facts and coming to its own conclusion. This is 
sufficient in itself to demonstrate error. In addition, the 
conclusion of the district court was not logical. For instance, , 
Mr. Heimark testified that an assignee would be necessary upon 
the exercise of the Option in order to take advantage of the 
tax provisions. (Tr. p. 76, line 20; testimony of Heimark). 
Lowenberg testified that he understood that Cerritos Trucking 
Company was only to be a "vehicle" or nominee. (Tr. p. 48; 
testimony of William Lowenberg). 
Logically, the fact that the Option was made expresslv 
assignable is supportive of Mr. Lowenberg's position. If the 
Option had not been expressly assignable, it could have been 
argued that Lowenberg should have been put on notice that 
Cerritos Trucking Company, and not the Fiber-Sciences Group, 
would of necessity exercise the Option. The fact that the Option; 
was assignable meant that the Fiber-Sciences Group could be the ! 
assignee of the Option and subsequently exercise that Option. 
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Thus, the fact that the Option was made expressly assignable 
is consistent with Mr. Lowenberg's understanding that Cerritos 
Trucking Company was a vehicle or nominee and that the Option 
would be exercised by the Fiber-Sciences Group at the appro-
priate time. 
Again, there is nothing unreasonable about such a 
course of action of Mr. Lowenberg. Certainly, the jury could 
have concluded or could have logically inferred from the evidence 
presented to them that Mr. Lowenberg reasonably relied upon the 
representations made to him that the Option would be for the 
benefit of the Fiber-Sciences Group. 
E. Plaintiffs and Cross-Defendants Were Negligent 
in Representing to Lowenberg that the Fiber-
Sciences Group Would Own or Participate in the 
Ownership of the Property. 
Prior to requesting Lowenberg to grant an option that 
would be for the benefit of the Fiber-Sciences Group, the 
Cerritos Group and Fiber-Sciences Group had entered into an 
agreement whereby Fiber-Sciences Group would participate in 
the ownership of the Property. (Tr. pp. 95-96; testimony of 
Donald Heimark). At that time, Mr. Heimark made no investiga-
tion, nor indeed was he aware, that a potential conflict of 
n 1 interest existed with respect to the officers of Fiber-Sciences 
I 
I owning a building and leasing that building to the corporation 
they represented. (Tr. pp. 91-92; testimony of Donald Heimark). 
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Mr. Dunahoo testified that he believed his participatio: 
in the ownership of the building and that of his associates was 
not improper. (Tr. p. 144, lines 1-3; testimony of Edmond 
Dunahoo). Later Mr. Dunahoo was informed that he and his asso-
ciates could not participate in the ownership of the building 
by counsel to EDO, the parent of Fiber-Sciences. 
Lowenberg had the right to rely upon the representation; I 
made to him that the Fiber-Sciences Group would have the ability 
to own the Property. Correspondingly, there was a duty on the 
part of the Fiber-Sciences Group and Cerritos Group to determine 
whether the Fiber-Sciences Group could participate in the ownershi:, 
of the building. 
In Dugan v. Jones, supra, this Court set forth the 
standard of care and competence required of one making material 
representations in connection with the purchase or sale of real 
property. 
"Jardine cites the Restatement, Torts, 
Sec. 552. The current standards of the 
evolving tort of negligent misrepresentation 
are set forth in Restatement, Torts, 2nd, 
Sec. 552: 
'(l) One who, in the course of his 
business, profession or employment, or 
in any other transaction in which he has 
a pecuniary interest supplies false in-
formation for the guidance of others in 
their business transactions, is subject 
to liability for pecuniary loss caused 
to them by their justifiable reliance 
upon the information, if he fails to 
exercise reasonable care or competence 
in obtaining or cotmnunicating the in-
formation.' 
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'(2) Except as stated in Subsection 
(3), the liability in Subsection (1) is 
limited to loss suffered. 
(a) by the person or one of 
a limited group of persons for whose 
benefit and guidance he intends to 
supply it; and 
(b) through reliance upon it 
in a transaction that he intends the 
information to influence or knows 
that the recipient so intends or in 
a substantially similar transaction.' 
Under comment e of Sec. 552 (p. 130), it 
is stated: 
'Since the rule of liability stated 
in Subsection (1) is based upon negligence, 
the defendant is subject to liability if, 
but only if, he has failed to exercise the 
care of competence of a reasonable man in 
obtaining or communicating the information .... 
'The particulars in which the recipient 
of information supplied by another is entitled 
to expect the exercise of care and competence 
depend upon the character of the information 
that is supplied. When the information con-
cerns a fact not known to the recipient, he 
is entitled to expect that the supplier will 
exercise that care and competence in its 
ascertainment which the supplier's business 
or profession requires and which, therefore, 
the supplier professes to have by engaging 
in it. Thus the recipient is entitled to 
expect that such investigations as are neces-
sary will be carefully made and that his 
informant will have normal business or pro-
fessional competence to form an intelligent 
judgment upon the data obtained .... " 
The actions of the Cerritos Group and the Fiber-
Sciences Group fall far short of the required level of care or 
competence. They had the power prior to making the representation 
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to determine whether or not a conflict of interest existed. 
They could have received an opinion of counsel or a firm 
approval from their parent corporation. They did neither. 
Rather, they were content to assume that such conflicts of 
interest as may have existed were not disabling. Having not 
done so, they were clearly negligent in making the unqualified 
and unconditional representation that the Fiber-Sciences Group 
would own or participate in the ownership of the Property 
to Lowenberg. 
Certainly, that fact was one peculiarly within the 
knowledge of the Fiber-Sciences Group. Mr. Lowenberg was not 
privy to the internal guidelines of EDO and Fiber-Sciences 
respecting conflicts of interest. Moreover, no one even 
alluded to the potential problem of a conflict of interest. 
The representations made to Mr. Lowenberg were unconditional 
and unqualified. Plaintiffs and cross-defendants were clearly 
negligent in not exercising care and competence to determine 
the ability of the Fiber-Sciences Group to participate in the 
ownership of the Property prior to making representations to 
Mr. Lowenberg. 
Again, the question of whether or not the representa· 
tions were negligently made was one for the jury. Evidence was 
presented upon which the jury could have determined that plain· 
tiffs and cross-defendants acted negligently. In this situatioo, 
it was error for the district court to grant a directed verdict, 
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taking this issue from the jury. 
F. There Was Evidence of Damage to Defendants as a 
Result of the Misrepresentations Made By Plaintiffs 
and Cross-Defendants. 
Mr. Lowenberg testified that among the concessions he 
maje to the Fiber-Sciences Group was the favorable price to be 
paid for the Property by the Fiber-Sciences Group upon the 
exercise of the Option. (Tr. p. 49; testimony of William 
Lowenberg) . 
At trial there was ample testimony to support Mr. 
Lowenberg's claim that the Property was worth more at the time 
the Option was granted than the option price for the Property. 
Dale Jackman, an MAI appraiser, testified as to the methods he 
usej in appraising the value of the Property as of April 28, 
1978, the time of the granting of the Option. (Tr. at pp. 231-
232; testimony of Dale Jackman). He then testified that in his 
opinion the Property at the time the Option was granted was 
worth $1,750,000.00. (Tr. at p. 237; testimony of Dale Jackman). 
That was some $200,000.00 in excess of the option price set 
for the Property at or about that time. In addition, Exhibit D-L2 
was received into evidence, which exhibit stated Mr. Jackman's 
opinion as to the value of the Property on or about April 28, 
1978. That exhibit similarly sets a value for the Property at 
that time of $1,750,000.00, or $200,000.00 more than the option 
price. 
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In rebuttal to Mr. Jackman, plaintiffs offer the 
testimony of Larry Rigby, who is not an MAI approved appraiser, 
and, presumably, whose testimony on that basis might have been 
less credible in the eyes of a jury. Even Mr. Rigby, plaint~ 
expert, testified that the Property at the time of the Option 
had a value of from $1,600,000.00 to $1,645,000.00. (Tr. p. 26J., 
testimony of Larry Rigby). Thus, plaintiffs' expert also testi· i 
fied that the Property was worth from $50,000.00 to $95,000.00 
more at the time of the granting of the Option than the option 
price stated. 
Similarly, Mr. Daughtrey had prepared for plaintiffs, 
and had provided to Mr. Heimark, several projections of the 
value of the Property. The range of values for the Property 
in Mr. Daughtrey's projections was from $1,600,000.00 to 
$1,890,000.00. Thus, Mr. Heimark was presented with informa-
tion that the Property was worth from $50,000.00 to $340,000.00 
more than the option price. 
The foregoing demonstrates that ample evidence as to 
damages was presented to the jury from which the jury could have 
concluded that Mr. Lowenberg suffered damages owing to his grant· 
ing of the Option to purchase the Property. 
G. Defendants Offered Testimony as to All of the 
Elements of Negligent Misrepresentation. 
As set forth in Dugan v. Jones, supra: 
"The elements of an action in deceit 
based on fraudulent misrepresentation are: 
I 
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mt· 
(1) a representation; (2) concerning a 
presently existing material fact; (3) which 
was false; (4) which the representor either 
(a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly, 
knowing that he had insufficient knowledge 
upon which to base such representation; (5) 
for the purpose of inducing the other party 
to act upon it; (6) that the other party, 
acting reasonably and in ignorance of its 
falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) 
and was thereby induced to act; (9) to his 
injury and damage." 
As it has been noted, in an action based upon negli-
gent misrepresentation, item (4) above requires only the lack 
of due care and competence on the part of the actor, and not 
fraud or recklessness. 
Defendants submit that the evidence at trial was 
sufficient from which a jury could find: 
(1) Plaintiffs and cross-defendants represented 
to Mr. Lowenberg that the Option would be for the 
benefit of the Fiber-Sciences Group and they would 
either own or participate in the ownership of the 
Property; 
(2) That agreement and intention was an existing 
material fact; 
(3) That fact proved false; 
(4) Plaintiffs and cross-defendants made such 
representation negligently; 
(5) That representation was made to induce Mr. 
Lowenberg to grant the Option; 
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(6) Mr. Lowenberg acted reasonably and in 
ignorance of its falsity; 
(7) Mr. Lowenberg did in fact rely upon that 
representation; 
(8) Mr. Lowenberg was induced to act by that 
representation; and 
(9) Mr. Lowenberg was damaged thereby. 
Defendants submit that the evidence set forth, supra, 
was sufficient to demonstrate that a jury could have found 
that all elements were satisfied. In this situation, it was 
error on the part of the district court to grant directed ver-
dicts. 
POINT Ill. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RECEIVING AND 
SIGNING FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW SUBSEQUENT TO RULING ON THE MOTION 
FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT. 
This Court has previously ruled in Smith v. Thornton, 
23 Utah 2d 110, 458 P.2d 870 that on a motion for a directed 
verdict the trial court need not enter findings and conclusions 
in granting the motion. That ruling was consistent with the 
language of Rule 52(a) which sets forth those instances in 
which the district courts are to find facts and state conclu-
sions of law. Rule 52(a) excludes motions under Rule 50. 
Not only should a trial court not be required to 
state findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is inconsistent 
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with the edicts of Rule SO(a) and the right to a trial by jury 
for a court to do so. Pursuant to Rule SO(a), a motion for a 
directed verdict "shall state the specific grounds therefor". 
It is thus clear that the moving party has the burden of stating 
with specificity the grounds, factual and legal, upon which a 
motion for a directed verdict is based. That in turn suggests 
that it is inappropriate for findings and conclusions to be 
subsequently entered that could bolster and enlarge upon the 
specific grounds upon which the motion rested. 
As a practical matter, findings of fact and conclusions 
of law are typically drafted by the successful party. In fact, 
in this action, the district court invited counsel for plaintiffs 
to draft findings of fact and conclusions of law. (Tr. pp. 331-
332). Plaintiffs' counsel did so, and the district court signed 
those findings and conclusions over the objection of counsel for 
defendants. In that situation, the findings and conclusions 
are not drafted in the light most fa\~rable to the opposing and 
losing party. Rather, they are drafted, as is customarily the 
case, to support the decision of the court in granting the motion. 
Because upon review of a motion for directed verdict 
this Court is required to view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the party against whom the directed verdict was 
granted, subsequent findings of fact and conclusions of law 
must be disregarded. 
In O'Brien v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 293 F.2d 1 
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(3rd Cir. 1960), motions were granted in a jury trial at the 
close of plaintiff's case both pursuant to Rule 4l(b) and 
pursuant to Rule 50. In that case, plaintiff on appeal 
challenged the filing of findings of fact and conclusions 
of law. The Third Circuit, with respect to its review of 
the motion for a directed verdict pursuant to Rule 50, 
ignored the findings of fact and conclusions of law, stating 
as follows: 
"If the court grants it no findings of 
fact are necessary and upon review the 
evidence must be viewed in the light 
most favorable to the party against 
whom the motion is made. Hence in this 
case it is held that no findings of fact 
were necessary, any indication in 
Makowsky v. Pavlick, supra, to the con-
trary notwithstanding." 
293 F.2d at 9. 
In order for this Court to review the record in the 
light most favorable to defendants, as it must, it must ignore 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law filed subsequently 
by the court as drafted by counsel for plaintiffs. Defendants 
respectfully submit that this Court should strike the findings 
of fact and conclusions of law on the basis that not only are 
such findings and conclusions not required pursuant to Rule 50, 
but that they may not be filed by the court in support of the 
granting of a motion for a directed verdict. Any other rule 
is an open invitation for the district court to sift and weigh 
evidence in the same fashion that it would in a non-jury trial. 
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POINT IV. THERE WAS EVIDENCE PRESENTED FROM WHICH 
THE JURY COULD HAVE CONCLUDED THAT 
PLAINTIFFS AND CROSS-DEFENDANTS BREACHED 
FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS OWED TO DEFENDANTS. 
A. Evidence Was Presented From Which the Jury 
Could Have Determined that Plaintiffs and 
Cross-Defendant Dunahoo Breached Fiduciary 
Duties Owing to Lowenberg. 
Under Utah law the issue of whether a fiduciary duty 
exists and has been breached is a question of fact to be deter-
mined by the jury. (Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298 (1978); 
Mccutcheon v. Brownfield, 2 Wash. App. 348, 467 P.2d 868, 874 
(1970)). In so doing, all pertinent facts and circumstances 
must be considered. 
In this action, plaintiffs and Mr. Lowenberg had 
more than the usual purchaser-seller relationship. Mr. 
Lowenberg was induced to grant the Option as a result of 
representations made that it would be for the benefit of, 
and indeed a personal benefit for, the Fiber-Sciences Group. 
Mr. Lowenberg was asked to grant a personal benefit to the 
Fiber-Sciences Group in a transaction that properly only 
concerned Fiber-Sciences, Inc. and Mr. Lowenberg. 
Because of the fact that the Fiber-Sciences Group, 
through the agency of Mr. Daughtrey, requested a personal and 
unusual benefit from Mr. Lowenberg, the jury could have easily 
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inferred that a fiduciary relationship existed, at least to 
the extent of requiring the Fiber-Sciences Group and plaintiffs 
to ensure that the representation that the Fiber-Sciences Group 
would own or participate in the owenrship of the Property was 
fulfilled. The making of a request for a special personal 
benefit and the representations made to Mr. Lowenberg are 
certainly sufficient so that the jury could have determined 
that a relationship of trust and confidence existed between 
plaintiffs and the Fiber-Sciences Group on the one hand and 
Mr. Lowenberg on the other hand. 
Certainly, this issue was not addressed by the moving 
parties in their motion for a directed verdict or by the court 
in its response thereto. This issue was simply by-passed or 
perhaps assumed away, sub silentio. 
Defendants submit that there was ample evidence pre-
sented from which a jury could have determined that a relation-
ship of trust and confidence existed between Mr. Lowenberg on 
the one hand and plaintiffs and cross-defendant Dunahoo on the 
other hand and that said relationship of trust and confidence 
had been breached by the failure of the representations made 
to Mr. Lowenberg to be fulfilled and, further, by the absence 
of timely notice to Mr. Lowenberg when it was determined that 
the Fiber-Sciences Group could not participate in the ownership 
of the Property. 
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B. Evidence Was Adduced From Which the Jury Could 
Have Determined that the Cross-Defendant 
Bettilyon Breached a Duty of Trust and Confidence. 
Cross-defendant Bettilyon Realty Company, by and 
through its agent and employee, Gerald Daughtrey, had undertaken 
to find a tenant for Mr. Lowenberg. Subsequently, Mr. Daughtrey 
registered with Mr. Lowenberg Fiber-Sciences, Inc. That meant 
that should Fiber-Sciences, Inc. lease or purchase the Property, 
Bettilyon Realty Company would be entitled to a commission. In 
fact, a commission of $70,000.00 was paid to Bettilyon Realty 
by Mr. Lowenberg. 
In this situation, a duty of trust and loyalty exists 
between the owner of property and a licensed real estate agency 
that undertakes to lease or sell it, or present offers to that 
effect, for or to the owner. 
Unfortunately, Mr. Daughtrey was, in fact, represent-
ing both sides in this transaction. He had undertaken to locate 
for Fiber-Sciences, Inc. a property suitable for its needs. In 
so doing, he was acting as agent for and on behalf of Fiber-
Sciences, Inc. 
The practicality of the matter from Bettilyon's and 
Mr. Daughtrey's standpoint was that if an arrangement could be 
negotiated whereby Fiber-Sciences, Inc. would lease or purchase 
the Property from Mr. Lowenberg, then he would be ensured of a 
commission. If Fiber-Sciences did not lease or purchase the 
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Property from Mr. Lowenberg, but some other entity so did, 
Bettilyon and Mr. Daughtrey would not. get a commission. 
In this situation, it is quite clear that Mr. 
Daughtrey bent his efforts towards achieving what the Fiber-
Sciences officers and Mr. Heimark and his associates wished 
in derrogation of his duty to arrange or negotiate an optimal 
situation for Mr. Lowenberg. 
Mr. Daughtrey testified that although he attended 
meetings with Mr. Dunahoo and Mr. Heimark and others, at which 
the needs of Fiber-Sciences were discussed, he did not report 
to Mr. Lowenberg what transpired at those meetings. Further, 
it is abundantly evident that Mr. Daughtrey did not attempt 
to negotiate a lease of the Property from Fiber-Sciences as 
Mr. Lowenberg had desired, even though Mr. Daughtrey presumably 
knew that Fiber-Sciences would agree to lease the Property. 
Instead, he directed his efforts to•Jards arranging a purchase 
of the Property, consistent with the wishes of Mr. Dunahoo and 
Mr. Heimark, but inconsistent with the wishes of Mr. Lowenberg. 
From the above, the jury could well have determined 
that Bettilyon Realty, through Gerald Daughtrey, breached its 
obligation of trust and confidence owed to Lowenberg in that 
it did not attempt to arrange a lease as Mr. Lowenberg desired 
and did not fully report to Mr. Lowenberg all the information 
Mr. Daughtrey had as to Fiber-Sciences' needs and wishes. As 
this Court stated in Dugan v. Jones, supra: 
-38-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-"Though not occupying a fiduciary relation-
ship with prospective purchasers, a real estate 
agent hired by the vendor is expected to be 
honest, ethical and competent and is answerable 
at law for breaches of his or her statutory 
duty to the public." 
The real estate agent owes an even greater duty to the 
seller of the property whom he represents. He did not fairly 
and fully represent Lowenberg. Rather, he failed to inform 
Lowenberg that Fiber-Sciences, Inc. would lease the Property 
whether or not a purchase option was granted to its officers. 
This was a clear breach of his duty to Mr. Lowenberg. Caught 
in a situation of conflict, Mr. Daughtrey chose to represent 
the interests of Mr. Heimark and Mr. Dunahoo in derrogation 
to his duty to Mr. Lowenberg. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants submit that the foregoing demonstrates 
conclusively that the district court erred in not allowing the 
jury to determine matters entrusted to them pursuant to the 
laws of the State of Utah. Defendants clearly met their 
burden of presenting evidence from which the jury could have, 
and probably would have, ruled in favor of defendants and 
against plaintiffs and cross-defendants. In this situation, 
the proper remedy is for this Court to remand for a new trial 
in order that defendants be given their right to a trial by 
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jury as provided by the Constitution, statutes and decisional 
law of the State of Utah. 
1981. 
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of January, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL &. McCARTHY 
Robert A. Peterson 
By--+~,,..,.~~~-""-'d,.JA? U::;.==~=-=-~~~­
Attorne)ls°""'fc;=r Defendants and 
Cross Plaintiffs - Appellants 
SO South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
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